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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Carolene
Products Co. generated the most famous footnote-and perhaps the
most famous passage-in all of the American Judiciary's treatment
of constitutional law. Among other things, Footnote Four suggested
that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry."' The importance of this principle cannot be
1 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). In particular,
the footnote highlighted the potential need for special protection of "religious . . . or
national ... or racial minorities." Id. In its entirety, the footnote reads:
There may be narrow scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359, 369-70; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting
judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment than are most other types of legislation. On restrictions upon
the right to vote, see Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536; Nixon v. Condon,
286 U.S. 73; on restraints upon the dissemination of information, see Near
v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14, 718-20, 722; Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233; Lovell v. Griffin, supra; on interferences
with political organizations, see Stromberg v. California, supra, 369; Fiske
v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373-78;
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242; and see Holmes, J., in Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 673; as to prohibition of peaceable assembly, see De
Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the
review of statutes directed at particular religious, Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, or national, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390;
Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404; Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, or
racial minorities, Nixon v. Herndon, supra; Nixon v. Condon, supra:
whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. Compare
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,428; South Carolina State Highway
Department v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184, n.2, and cases cited.
Id. (parallel citations omitted). Those elements of this footnote that focus on explicit textual
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overstated. It pervaded the work of the Warren Court2 and has
played a prominent role in constitutional discourse ever since.3
In this Article, I reflect on the "discrete and insular minorities"
component of Footnote Four, denominating it in shorthand fashion
as the "unempoweredness principle." In doing so, I draw on the
seminal work of my colleague Milner Ball and also touch on the
work of other scholars, most notably Professor Cass Sunstein. I
examine three main subjects. First, I speak of the possibility that
the rising rhetoric and reality of constitutional "minimalism" may
dilute long-vibrant understandings of the unempoweredness
principle. Second, I investigate one form that dilution of the
unempoweredness principle might take-namely, by way of
transforming it (in whole or in part) from a rule of hard-and-fast
constitutional law into a rule of statutory interpretation. Third, I
consider whether the unempoweredness principle now faces the
prospect of wholesale abandonment.
One theme of Milner Ball's work concerns the centrality of
narratives to understanding law and life. For this reason, I have
woven a few stories into this Article. Here is one of them:
II. THE STORY OF NAMING THIS ARTICLE
Several months ago, Bret Hobson, who was then serving as editor
in chief of the Georgia Law Review, asked me to write something
that touched on the work of Milner Ball for inclusion in this special
issue. I accepted the invitation and began to give the matter some
thought. The subject I came up with (as I have noted) focuses on
Footnote Four, judicial minimalism, the future of Carolene Products
jurisprudence, what Milner might think of that, and the like.
Having identified this half-baked topic, I tried to cook up a title. My
guarantees of rights (paragraph 1) and judicial protection of the proper operation of political
processes (paragraph 2)-as opposed to judicial protection of"discrete and insular minorities"
(paragraph 3)-are, for the most part, beyond the scope of this Article.
2 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75
(1980) (noting that the "Warren Court's approach was foreshadowed" by Footnote Four).
' Accord, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 128 (1991) (noting that these
"remarks about 'discrete and insular minorities'.. . have been enormously influential in the
development of American law over the last half-century"). See generally infra notes 111-56
and accompanying text.
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initial thought was Footnote Four, Milner Ball, and the Proper
Judicial Role. Not very informative, I concluded, and decided to
move on. I fared little better with later-hatched ideas, such as
Where Footnote Four Is Headed and What Milner Ball Might Think
and Discrete and Insular Minorities, Milner Ball, and the Direction
of Constitutional Law.
As this process unfolded, I began to think more systematically
about what I wanted my title to accomplish. I decided that my goal
was to honor Milner as best I could. Because one way to do so might
be to include his name in the title, I came up with some additional
possibilities, such as Footnote Four from the Perspective of Milner
Ball or simply Footnote Four: A Tribute to Milner Ball. An
alternate approach involved the tried-and-true tactic of alliteration.
One idea was Footnote Four's Future: Of Minorities, Minimalism,
and Milner Ball. (If only Cass Sunstein's name had started with an
"M," I told myself, he might have made the list, too.)
In the end, I decided to go in another direction. I chose a title
that did not mention Milner by name because I suspected that
naming him might send the unintended message that there would
not be much to read here apart from flattering fluff. I also decided
to go short, rather than long, reasoning that a terse and suggestive
title might draw readers in. In sum, I decided that the title that
now identifies this Article would honor Milner more than a title that
bore his name because it would maximize the chances that readers
would peruse the piece and, in so doing, learn something, or
something more, of Milner's remarkable work. My effort to draw in
readers, of course, may prove unsuccessful, but the point is that I
tried. And my effort did not focus on simply communicating
information clearly. I had other designs. Indeed, one might say
that I was intentionally using words in an effort not to communicate
clearly, but instead to be vague and enticing.4
Fair enough, you might say, but what does this story have to do
with Footnote Four? The answer is that-as Milner has taught us
through a lifetime of work-words matter deeply. That is true
whether they are used by Madison Avenue hucksters, political
4 To be a bit less dramatic (and a bit more accurate), perhaps I should say that I was
trying to be as "enticing" as one can be in the title of a law review article.
800 [Vol. 41:797
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spinmeisters, or legal academics. Of particular importance is the
idea that words do far more work than simply communicating facts
and ideas. They draw attention. They create a mood. They stir
emotion. They generate beauty. They draw images from memory
and etch new images there, too. Words steer human actions. They
inspire acts of consequence, even fighting to the death. And they
shape our law.' Again, these effects occur not only because well-
used words effectively convey important realities or concepts.
Powerful effects occur in large part because the words themselves
exert pushes and pulls--often at a subconscious or barely conscious
level-and that is true with respect to the words offered in and
about Footnote Four.
III. MILNER BALL'S CONCEPTION OF THE UNEMPOWEREDNESS
PRINCIPLE
So what words has Milner Ball offered up on the meaning and
significance of Justice Stone's allusion to "discrete and insular
minorities"? In 1974, Milner was an assistant professor three years
out of law school. Yet, at that early stage, he produced a
remarkable paper entitled Judicial Protection of Powerless
Minorities.6 Already well aware of the power of words, Milner
opened his piece with the face-slapping rhetoric of political activist
Dick Gregory. "The cats wearing the white sheets took our rights
away from us," Gregory wrote, so "it's only natural that the cats in
the black robes should give them back."7 Milner was off and
running with an article that would consider both the origins and the
implications of the unempoweredness principle.
' For an example of the potentially profound effects of subtle changes in word use, see
Garry Wills, At Ease, Mr. President, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2007, at A17 (noting now common
reference to the phase "our commander in chief," but urging that: "[Tihe President is not our
commander in chief. He certainly is not mine. I am not in the Army.").
6 Milner S. Ball, Judicial Protection of Powerless Minorities, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1059
(1974).
7 Id. at 1059.
20071
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A. OF ORIGINS
Milner's article covered much ground in defending and developing
this principle. According to him, Footnote Four taught that
"j] udicial attention is appropriate because of the assumption that
prejudice may have prevented those within the political processes
from protecting those without."' Common sense and simple justice
suggested that "those who cannot defend themselves.., are to be
shielded by the courts."9 Indeed, "one of the components of the act
of founding was recognition of the need to nourish minorities. To
protect the powerless is, then, a way to recur to the originating
vision .... .""
Milner emphasized that the unempoweredness principle had its
roots in thinking from the framing period, particularly as reflected
in The Federalist." In The Federalist No. 10, for example, James
Madison focused squarely on the potential created in systems
founded on democratic rule for self-interested legislation by "the
most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction"
and "[the] opportunity and temptation... given to a predominant
party, to trample on the rules of justice." 2 Majoritarian tyranny,
according to the Father of the Constitution, threatened both "the
public good, and private rights,"'3 including "sacred rights," 4
"religious rights,"" and "civil rights." 6 As a result, the framers' goal
had been to create "a government which will protect all parties, the
weaker as well as the more powerful," 7 in part because "no man can
be sure that he may not be to-morrow the victim of a spirit of
8 Id. at 1063.
' Id. at 1060 n.3.
10 Id. at 1070-71.
" See id. at 1065 (noting, for example, James Madison's concern for minority protection
because of possibilities that"a majority of the people might employ the government to oppress
a minority of the people").
12 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 60 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961). See
generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison) (describing methods of controlling
factions).
13 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 12, at 61 (noted at Ball, supra
note 6, at 1066).
14 THE FEDERALIST No. 14 (James Madison), supra note 12, at 88.
15 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 12, at 351.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 352.
802 [Vol. 41:797
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injustice, by which he may be a gainer to-day."" These passages,
according to Milner, gave rise to a core idea: "[Pirotection of
minorities is not a matter of accommodation, tolerance, or
concession on the part of the majority. Rather, it is the practice of
human maturity, the recognition of what ultimately constitutes self-
interest."19
Milner was right to look to The Federalist in seeking support for
Footnote Four. In fact, the essays include many warnings about the
need to protect minorities against the "oppression" ° and "passions"2
of short-sighted majorities.22 As Milner recognized, however, it is
not entirely clear that the authors of the essays envisioned a direct
judicial role in safeguarding minority interests.23 Rather, the focus
of The Federalist was on the use of political structures-the
expanded republic, bicameralism and presentment, the continued
empowerment of states, and the filtration of public opinion through
properly chosen representatives-as antidotes to majority
overreaching.24 Did "Publius" (the self-named author of the
pseudonymous Federalist essays25 ) also envision that judicial
interventions would help protect groups wrongly excluded from
having a say in the halls of political power?
There are signals he did, at least if commonly used tools of
structural inference are brought to bear. For example, The
Federalist No. 10, spoke of achieving fairness and stability through
a dynamic, continuous process of dialogue and accommodation
18 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 528.
'9 Ball, supra note 6, at 1067.
20 THE FEDERALIST CONCORDANCE 369 (Thomas S. Engeman, Edward J. Erler & Thomas
B. Hofeller eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 1988) (1980) (listing seventeen occurrences of word
"oppression").
21 Id. at 391 (listing forty-three occurrences of word "passions").
22 See generally Dan T. Coenen, OfPitcairn's Island andAmerican Constitutional Theory,
38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 649, 658-60 (1997) (summarizing framers' fear of majority factions).
2 See Ball, supra note 6, at 1068 (noting that Madison focused on how majority tyranny
could be dampened by proper structuring of the representative branches).
24 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (describing advantages of republics over
pure democracies in controlling majority tyranny). See generally Coenen, supra note 22, at
666-71 (listing political structures of American Constitution designed to neutralize majority
factions).
' See Jacob E. Cooke, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST, at xi (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(noting that essays were written under name "Publius").
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among an ever-evolving universe of minority interest groups.26 The
image created by Madison's words is one of broad inclusion,2 v with
interest-group strength reflecting at least a rough proportionality to
interest-group numbers. But what if one group is systematically
excluded by effective alliances among other "factions," or given far
less practical leverage than its numbers fairly justify? Such a result
would throw the entire Madisonian machinery out of whack. And
who else could protect such a group except for federal judges?
What is more, the authors of The Federalist conceived of the
Judiciary as a part of, rather than apart from, the democratic
institutions of government.2" If the Senate was designed to reflect
the long view of public policy, 29 the Judiciary was designed to take
an even longer view on behalf of "We the People."3 ° Given this
outlook, it is far from clear that the authors of The Federalist would
condemn judicial intervention on constitutional grounds as anti-
democratic. And it would be all the more difficult to apply that label
when courts were acting to protect persons excluded in systematic
fashion from the give-and-take of interest-group jostling that The
26 See THE FEDERALISTNO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 12, at 60 (noting that because
causes of factions cannot be removed, relief must be sought by controlling effects).
27 See THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 12, at 251 (deeming it
"essential to [republican] government, that it be derived from the great body of the society,
not from an unconsiderable proportion or favored class of it").
m See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 525 (noting the
critical role of the Court in implementing the popular will as expressed in the Constitution).
As Milner noted:
If one begins with the premise that majority rule is the comprehensive
and dominant feature of the American scheme, then judicial review will
be perceived as an intervention or intrusion. On the other hand, if, with
the present approach, one adopts the premise of Madison and Hamilton
that the American republic is a mode for securing minority rights while
at the same time preserving the form and substance of popular
government, then judicial review protective of minority rights will present
itself as consonant with the normal functioning of the machinery of our
government.
Ball, supra note 6, at 1072-73.
29 Dan T. Coenen, The Story of the Federalist: How Hamilton and Madison Reconceived
America 132 (Apr. 21, 2006) (unpublished book manuscript, on file with author).
30 E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 525-27 (noting
that in conflict between the will of legislature and will of people as expressed in the
Constitution, judges should be governed by the latter). This idea has found modern
expression in the work of Bruce Ackerman, among others. See generally ACKERMAN, supra
note 3.
804
2007] THE FUTURE OF FOOTNOTE FOUR 805
Federalist saw as key to the operation of republican self-
government.3'
In any event, the Fourteenth Amendment changed everything.3 2
By way of that amendment, the Judiciary received an official charge
to ensure "the equal protection of the laws" to "any person within
[state's] jurisdiction."33 The term "equal protection" is not self-
defining. It seems natural enough to say, however, that its meaning
" See ELY, supra note 2, at 80-84 (developing connection between the Madisonian vision
of factions and judicial protection of the "technically represented" but "functionally
powerless"). Milner made much the same point in these words:
The Court exercises authority in judging, so long as its judgments recur
to the beginning of the republic as well as carry forward the vision which
was embodied in the Constitution. As was discussed previously, one of the
components of the act of founding was recognition of the need to nourish
minorities. To protect the powerless is, then, a way to recur to the
originating vision, to redeem its pledge, and thus to exercise authority.
Ball, supra note 6, at 1070-71. There is a great deal more to be said on this large topic,
particularly with respect to the Federalist essays that specifically consider the judicial power.
For some suggestive comments, see generally Sotirios A. Barber, Judicial Review and The
Federalist, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 836 (1988).
2 Accord, e.g., ELY, supra note 2, at 86 ("Whatever may have been the case before, the
Fourteenth Amendment quite plainly imposes a judicially enforceable duty of virtual
representation."). So, perhaps, did the Ninth Amendment, as Professor Ely has argued. See
id. at 32-33 (suggesting that the Court's protection of racial minorities against discrimination
by the federal government is properly rooted in the Ninth Amendment). The intersection of
the Ninth Amendment and the "discrete and insular minorities" principle is beyond the scope
of this Article, as is the intersection of that principle with the Guarantee Clause, as well as
Amendments I through VIII, including the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in public schools
operated under federal authority violated Due Process Clause). Also essentially beyond the
scope of this paper is the possibility of inferring the unempoweredness principle from
constitutional "structures and relationships," see generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE
AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Ox Bow Press 1985) (1969), or the "tacit
postulates" of the Constitution, see Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934),
under authorities like McCulloch v. Maryland. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819). It is noteworthy in this regard that (as Professor Ely and others have observed)
the "discrete and insular minorities" component of Carolene Products methodology bears a
kinship to the nontextual principle of federal government tax immunity embraced by the
Court in McCulloch. In particular, both principles gain impetus from The Federalist's strong
endorsement of the idea that "[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause." THE
FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 12, at 59. The basic thrust of Footnote Four,
after all, is that the self-serving majorities that systematically exclude or unreasonably
dampen minority voices in the political process will systematically favor themselves in the
process of determining where legislatively created benefits and burdens should flow. For this
reason, it is hardly surprising that Justice Stone alluded to McCulloch in Footnote Four itself.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (quoted supra note 1).
33 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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should flow, at least in part, from the animating premises of our
entire system of republican self-governance. Accepting this
proposition, the Fourteenth Amendment-when conjoined with The
Federalist-lends support to the vital principle that members of
groups systematically disadvantaged in our political processes
require protection from an independent judiciary that (precisely
because it is independent) is uniquely well suited to safeguard their
interests.
B. OF IMPLICATIONS
In his article on Footnote Four, Milner did more than defend the
unempoweredness principle on functional, structural, and
originalist grounds. He also emphasized the need to give that
principle a practical significance. Milner noted, for example, that
"the existence of prejudice will not always be readily discernible,"
since legislators seldom publicly celebrate their schemes of self-
interested oppression.34 It followed that "the responsibility of the
judiciary" includes "the duty to make a rigorous examination" to
determine if legislation had "its origin in prejudice."35 Again with
an eye to practical justice, Milner recognized that a proper list of
"discrete and insular" minorities must reach beyond groups defined
by racial and religious characteristics. In keeping with Hamilton's
admonition that judicial elaboration of principles embodied in an
enduring Constitution would have to unfold over time,3" Milner
observed that "other minorities will continue to emerge into
recognition."37 Milner also emphasized that judges charged with
protecting minorities would have to act with the sort of damn-the-
torpedoes courage that the Constitution's structuring of the judicial
4 Ball, supra note 6, at 1063. Again, The Federalist is informative on this point, since
it specifically emphasized the risk that lawmakers would hatch "plans of oppression" born of
"unjust or dishonorable purposes" in a behind-the-scenes manner. THE FEDERALIST No. 10
(James Madison), supra note 12, at 64.
3 Ball, supra note 6, at 1063.
3 See THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 553 (" 'Tis time
only that can mature and perfect so compound a system, can liquidate the meaning of all the
parts, and can adjust them to each other in a harmonious and consistent whole.").
' Ball, supra note 6, at 1060 n.3.
806 [Vol. 41:797
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branch was designed to foster.3" At least in this field, a court's
"function is to offer assessments about performance instead of to
win adherents."39  It followed that courts applying the
unempoweredness principle could not "delay the making of hard
decisions,"4 ° far less capitulate to majority prejudices by fixing their
sights on "the misleading criteria of statesmanship, success, and
self-preservation."4
Finally, Milner sought to bring new clarity to this field. He noted
that the term "discrete and insular" holds the potential to mislead
because, for example, "[a] minority may flourish in chosen
isolation."42 The term "minorities" also could steer one off course
because "powerlessness rather than size is decisive," as
illustrated-at least historically-by the case of women.43 Milner
directed special attention to the poor, emphasizing that one's
impoverished status (on top of negative stereotypes and over-
generalized assumptions held by elites who seldom visit the world
in which the poor actually find themselves) of itself impedes equal
access to the levers of power.44 He went on to explore the connection
38 See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
39 Ball, supra note 6, at 1076.
40 Id. at 1077-78.
41 Id. at 1075. The latter passage took aim at Professor Alexander Bickel's then-recently-
expressed admonitions regarding judicial restraint. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGREss 38 (1970) (arguing, for example, that "judicial judgment
[is] statesmanship superimposed on the democratic political process").
42 Ball, supra note 6, at 1080.
Id. Milner also emphasized that powerlessness is contextual in the sense that a group
may be voiceless in one setting but not another. To prove this proposition, Milner cited the
dormant Commerce Clause cases. National trucking firms, he suggested, are not normally
thought of as discrete and insular minorities. But they at least had a plausible case for
judicial intervention when a single state (perhaps for protectionist reasons) substantially
impeded their operations. Id. at 1080-81.
See id. at 1084 (emphasizing that "[p]overty ... is ... [a] shared characteristic causally
related to powerlessness"). Lest the point be overlooked, Milner's views on this subject were
(as usual) nuanced and attentive to real-world complexities. He acknowledged, for example,
that "[plracticality may argue against the elevation of poverty to the status of a shared
characteristic" that inevitably warranted heightened scrutiny. Id. at 1086. At the same time,
he emphasized that "[dievotion to 'free enterprise' cannot be allowed to override the
commitment of enlightened self-interest to nourish minorities whether poor or racial or
otherwise." Id. at 1087 n. 145. Attentive to the particular power of words emanating from our
nation's highest tribunal, he urged that at least "[t]he Court should not forbear to remind of
this commitment." Id. Drawing on the Court's own precedents, he emphasized the
continuing judicial duty to give some measure of protection to the "basic needs" of those
laboring under the scourge of poverty. Id. at 1087. In this regard he noted that "what and
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:797
of Footnote Four to Roe v. Wade,45 offering a range of observations,46
some of which anticipated justificatory insights provided only later
by the author of the opinion himself.
4 v
Milner has lost battles along the way. For example, he urged
that heightened scrutiny should extend to at least some forms of de
facto discrimination, given the inevitability that legislators will too
easily overlook "the deserving interests of a politically voiceless and
invisible minority," whether on purpose or not.' The Court,
however, rejected such a disparate-impact approach in Washington
v. Davis49 and its progeny.5 ° One also senses that the Court has not
gone as far as Milner would prefer in protecting the poor under the
unempoweredness principle.5'
Even in these areas, however, ideas embraced by Milner have
carried the day to some degree. The Court's willingness to consider
how much is fundamental to the protection of a minority" is a relative concept, contingent in
part on "what the majority gathers to itself." Id. at 1088. He added that '[in order for
minorities to sustain themselves or for members of minorities to make a way, if they choose,
into the mainstreams of society, they must be adequately equipped according to
contemporaneously realistic standards." Id. Finally, in keeping with his deep notion of
inclusiveness, Milner emphasized that, in gauging fundamental rights, courts must ask:
"[Wihat does the minority advance as necessary? A minority's own understanding of its felt
needs must be attended to...." Id. (emphasis added).
45 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
' See, e.g., Ball, supra note 6, at 1091-94 (discussing relation of powerlessness principle
to both women and fetuses).
41 With regard to Milner's observations about women's rights and Roe, see supra note 46.
With regard to Justice Blackmun's subsequent insights, see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,928 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring injudgment,
dissenting in part) ("A State's restrictions on a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy...
implicate constitutional guarantees of gender equality."). Compare Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464, 483 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that "a distressing insensitivity to the
plight of impoverished pregnant women is inherent in the Court's analysis"), with Ball, supra
note 6, at 1092 n.179 (suggesting that 'lilt may be that poor women were the real minority
whose interests were vindicated by the Court" in Roe).
' See Ball, supra note 6, at 1083 n.117 (suggesting that de facto discrimination may be
as problematic as de jure discrimination).
'9 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
o See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (viewing a facially
neutral law as invalid under Equal Protection Clause only if traceable to discriminatory
purpose); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977)
(refusing to deem official action unconstitutional "solely because it results in a racially
disproportionate impact").
51 See, e.g., Ball, supra note 6, at 1091 n.173 (inviting the Court to reconsider earlier
rulings in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), and Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56
(1972)).
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discriminatory effects in inferring discriminatory purpose, for
example, may provide some measure of protection against the vice
of legislative blindness to the just claims of protected minorities.52
In similar fashion, the Court has remained open to protecting the
poor when the state threatens to deprive them of at least some sorts
of fundamental interests." For these reasons and others, the
unempoweredness principle continues to stand today as a significant
force in American constitutional law. Will things remain that way?
We turn now to that question.
IV. THE FUTURE OF FOOTNOTE FOUR
A. OF MINIMALISM AND DILUTION OF THE UNEMPOWEREDNESS
PRINCIPLE
Stories are not the only forms of words that pack heat. As any
political operative knows, slogans, labels, and "sound bite" phrases
shape thought and stir action in critical ways. In constitutional law,
one term of modern-day importance is "minimalism"-a concept
closely tied to the important and deeply thoughtful work of
Professor Cass Sunstein."4 The word denotes an approach to
constitutional decisionmaking that favors "narrow" and "shallow"
judicial actions;5" in other words, when courts issue constitutional
" See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623-24 (1982) (holding that a voting system's
operation in such a way that no black had ever been elected supported finding of
discriminatory purpose). As Justice Stevens has emphasized, the seemingly strong line
between de jure and de facto discrimination is blurred by the Court's insistence that proof of
the latter provides support for an inference of the former. Id. at 645-50 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also Davis, 426 U.S. at 253 (noting that "most probative evidence of intent...
[may] be objective evidence of what actually happened").
" See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 124 (1996) (recognizing right of indigent
mother, threatened with termination of parental rights, to free access to appellate review).
Milner was particularly prescient in predicting that the absence of an "absolute deprivation"
of education was key to the Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973). Thus, in Plyler v. Doe, the Court relied heavily on this very
distinction in invalidating a state tuition requirement imposed on children of undocumented
aliens. See generally 457 U.S. 202 (1981).
' See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING
COURTS ARE WRONGFORAMERICA (2005) (discussing four approaches, including minimalism,
that dominate constitutional debates).
" Professor Sunstein observes that minimalists "favor narrow rulings over wide ones,"
in the sense that "[t]hey like to decide cases one at a time." Id. at 29. Also, "[tihey favor
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rulings, they should (at least typically) do so in an "incompletely
theorized" way that sidesteps "broad pronouncements." 6
It merits emphasis that the word "minimalism" carries a self-
promoting power. It is short and catchy. It summons up celebrated
ideas of modesty, humility, and unselfishness. For those on the left,
it provides a welcome alternative to "originalism"-or what
Professor Sunstein (using another loaded term) prefers to call
"fundamentalism."5 7 For those on the right, it suggests a no less
welcome alternative to the sort of "activism" by "liberal judges" said
to have produced such rulings as Roe.
"Minimalism," in short, is a word that helps to sell minimalism
by conjuring up positive images, at least among the large number of
citizens who style themselves "moderates" (another term marked by
positive appeal).5" Of course, "minimalism" is more than a clever
word. In powerful fashion, Professor Sunstein has made the case for
it on normative grounds as the best available interpretive
methodology. 9  He also reports-with much accuracy-that
minimalist thinking has exerted a strong influence within the
Supreme Court in recent years.60
So what does minimalism have to say about the
unempoweredness principle? The answer to this question is
complex, and my purpose is not to capture that answer in all its
dimensions. Rather, I want to show how the rhetoric of minimalism
matters, how it might subtly (or not so subtly) shape thinking about
the Judiciary's proper role, and how it could invite a significant
retrenchment with respect to Footnote Four. More particularly, I
shallow rulings over deep ones, in the sense that they seek to avoid taking stands on the
biggest and most contested questions of constitutional law." Id. at 27.
6 Id. at 27-30.
' Id. at 26 (asserting that fundamentalists "believe that 'originalism' is the proper
approach for constitutional interpretation").
' In Western culture, the virtues of moderation are traceable back at least as far as the
time of Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 111 (H. Rackham trans., 1962) (n.d.)
(stating "that moral virtue is a mean, and in what sense this is so, namely that it is a mean
between two vices, one of excess and the other of defect; and that it is such a mean because
it aims at hitting the middle point in feelings and in actions").
i9 See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 54 (arguing for "minimalism"); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999) (same).
60 SUNSTEIN, supra note 54, at 245.
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will explore some of what Professor Sunstein has had to say about
this subject and some of what Professor Ball might say in response.
The story centers on Korematsu v. United States,61 a case that
upheld the exclusion of Japanese-Americans from the West Coast
during World War II and that Professor Sunstein considers in a
book section entitled "Minimalism in surprising places."62 By way
of background, Professor Sunstein claims that there are three
currently dominant competing schools of constitutional thought:
"minimalism" (which, as we have seen, focuses on judicial modesty
and adherence to precedent);63 "fundamentalism" (which focuses on
the framers' intentions at a high level of specificity, and is
associated with the "Constitution in Exile" movement);64 and
"perfectionism" (which involves making the open-ended clauses in
the Constitution "the best they can be" according to broad principles
of justice and sound political theory).65 Professor Sunstein posits
that Justice Scalia and (even more so) Justice Thomas are (or at
least purport to be) fundamentalists.66 He notes that perfectionists
can be either "liberal" or "conservative";67 identifies Justices
Brennan and Marshall as prominent perfectionist liberals;6" but
61 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
62 SUNSTEIN, supra note 54, at 186-88.
63 See id. at 27-30 (describing attributes of"minimalism").
See id. at 25-27 (discussing attributes of "fundamentalism").
65 See id. at 31-34 (discussing attributes of "perfectionism"). Professor Sunstein
associates perfectionism with the work of Professor Ronald Dworkin. Id. at 32. He also
reports that there is a fourth school of interpretive thought-namely, "majoritarianism,"
which Professor Sunstein associates with Professor James Bradley Thayer and Oliver
Wendell Holmes. Id. at 44-50. Professor Sunstein reports that majoritarianism, which
celebrates a highly noninterventionist judicial role, has no active adherents on the Court
today and few adherents in the academy as well. Id. at 44-50. For this reason, he gives the
methodology little attention.
' Id. at 30. I say "purport to be" in the preceding sentence because a key theme in
Sunstein's writing is that self-proclaimed fundamentalists are often "conservative
perfectionists" in disguise. See id. at 32 (noting that "some conservatives are perfectionists
in fundamentalist clothing"). He suggests, in particular, that would-be fundamentalists often
ignore original intent when that intent does not square with their own conceptions of sound
morals and good government. Id. According to Professor Sunstein, evidence in support of
this conclusion comes from (among other places) the fields of affirmative action,
nondelegation, gun control, campaign-finance regulation, commercial speech, Takings Clause
law, and affirmative action. Id. at 34. Like many important subjects, this one falls beyond
the scope of this Article.
6'7 Id. at 32.
68 Id.
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says that no comparable perfectionists sit on the Court today.69
Instead, the Court of recent years has had a minimalist cast, and
many of its rulings are best understood in minimalist terms. °
So what about Korematsu? In the view of Professor Sunstein, the
Court's "overall approach" to the case "has an unmistakable
minimalist feature" because the Court "emphasized that the
exclusion order was based on a recent congressional enactment,"
rather than action undertaken by the President alone.7' For this
reason:
[W]e can obtain a fresh perspective on how the Court
was approaching the American government's acts of
discrimination against Japanese-Americans. In short,
the Court was rejecting National Security
Fundamentalism and Liberty Perfectionism in favor of
a distinctive form of minimalism. In none of these cases
did the Court issue a broad ruling in favor of
presidential authority. [Rather,] . . . the Court paid
exceedingly careful attention to the role of legislation,
and thus refused to rule that the Commander in Chief
power allowed the President to act on his own. But in
permitting the executive to implement.., an exclusion
order, the Court also rejected Liberty Perfectionism,
indicating that it would yield to the shared judgments of
the two democratically accountable branches. 72
Put another way, Korematsu and its companion cases "reflect an
emphatically minimalist approach to civil liberties in wartime-an
approach that both defers to, and insists on, agreement from both
of the democratically accountable branches."73
69 Id. at 33.
70 See, e.g., id. at 29-31, 107 (discussing approaches of Justices Ginsburg and O'Connor);
id. at 188-90 (discussing minimalist opinion of Justice Souter); id. at 245 (associating
minimalism with Justices O'Connor and Kennedy). Professor Sunstein's book, which was
published in 2005, does not consider the interpretive styles of Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito.
71 Id. at 186-87.
72 Id. at 187-88.
73 Id. at 188.
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How would Milner Ball react to these words? My hunch is that
he would share thoughts like these:
How in heaven's name can you talk about Korematsu
this way? You're speaking of the forced relocation of
more than 120,000 human beings-most of them lifelong
American citizens. Based solely on their ethnicity!
Driven from their homes, their work, their churches,
their friends, their very lives-to distant and dismal
places for years on end. What's more, this was done on
a dragnet basis to every Japanese-American in
California and much of Washington, Oregon, and
Arizona. With no hearings afforded to anyone. In
America. With the Supreme Court's blessing.
"Minimalist"???? Who's kidding who?
He might add the following:
And don't you dare call me a "liberal perfectionist." Call
me someone who cares about justice, who hates racism,
who thinks-as I thought America taught the
world-that "all men are created equal." Who cares if
Congress joins a pact with the devil? Both elected
branches-notjust the President-must be watchdogged
for excess. And that's especially true in times of war.
You've missed a mountain range by peering at a mole
hill. Read The Federalist. When Madison wrote about
runaway passions, he was talking about the legislative
branch.74 Majority tyranny? If not in Korematsu, then
when?
Comments of this sort, I suspect, would provide only a beginning.
And whatever direction Milner's words might take, he would speak
more eloquently than I could ever do on his behalf. Indeed, how
Milner might use words in settings like this one is a major subject
74 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 12, at 57 (discussing factions
"united and actuated by some common impulse of passion").
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in and of itself. (For one potential source of insight see the "Wrath
of Milner," set forth in APPENDIX A.)
In fairness to Professor Sunstein, his comments on Korematsu
are critical of that decision in important respects. He observes that
"[it is tempting, and probably right, to see the Court's decisions as
cowardly and deplorable capitulations to intrusions on liberty that
had no justification in national security concerns."75 In addition, he
notes that "reasonable people object to these rulings" and that "the
Court should have emphasized the absence of unmistakeable
authorization from Congress."76 I suspect, however, that these
passages would only make Milner's blood boil more. "[Tiempting"?
"[Pirobably right"? All the executive needed was an "unmistakable
authorization"? Milner, I suspect, would recoil at these words,
stressing that the unspeakable tragedy endured by countless
Japanese-Americans is hopelessly lost in the lawyerly phrases and
tones. At the very least, Milner would worry that there is
something deeply insidious happening here, as words used to deal
with an event of catastrophic sorrow serve to give the occasion at
least a veneer of defensibility.
Professor Sunstein's musings about discrete and insular
minorities range beyond the Korematsu case. In fact, he writes
directly about Footnote Four in the following terms:
Some perfectionists invoke the Constitution itself to
justify their approach; they speak as if the document,
fairly read, necessarily generates the results they seek.
But this is implausible. More candid perfectionists
appeal to what they see as the requirements of
democracy. Call them democratic perfectionists. These
people believe that where the Constitution is ambiguous,
75 SUNSTEIN, supra note 54, at 186.
76 Id. at 188. It also should be noted that Professor Sunstein rightly highlights the
special dangers posed by the sort of starkly minority-targeting government action at issue in
Korematsu. See id. at 170-71 (noting that people in fear are "far more likely to tolerate
government action that abridges the freedom of members of some 'out-group' " and that
minority-targeting "infringements on liberties [do not] receive the natural political checks
that arise when majorities suffer").
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judges should interpret it to promote democracy rather
than to compromise it."
He continues:
Extending their democratic claims, they also insist that
the Court should protect those groups that are least able
to protect themselves in democratic arenas. For this
reason, they believe that the Constitution's Equal
Protection Clause should be interpreted to prevent
discrimination against African-Americans, women,
illegitimate children, disabled people, and (more
recently) gays and lesbians. Perfectionists contend...
a strong judicial role is . . . necessary to "perfect"
democracy itself.7
Again, there is much to say about all this, but the main point has
to do with the power of words. Characterizing Footnote Four
methodology as "perfectionist" creates no small risk that that
methodology will be promptly pigeonholed as activist, utopian, and
non-originalist. At best, this manner of labeling involves an
oversimplification. In particular, we already have seen that judicial
protection of discrete and insular minorities has roots in
constitutional text and history.79 For this reason alone, there are
problems in tying the unempoweredness principle to open-ended
efforts to make constitutional doctrines "the best they can be."8 ° No
less troubling is the suggestion that Footnote Four methodology
stands at cross purposes with minimalism itself. In this regard, it
bears emphasis that Professor Ely's theory ofjudicial review-at the
heart of which lay the unempoweredness principle-was driven by
a minimalist spirit. More specifically, Professor Ely's core purpose
77 Id. at 38.
78 Id. at 39.
9 See supra notes 8-32 and accompanying text; see also Paul Brest, The Misconceived
Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 224 (1980) (asserting that "a
moderate intentionalist could read the [Equal Protection Clause] to protect 'discrete and
insular minorities' besides blacks").
80 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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was to steer courts toward a focus on protecting the proper
functioning of republican processes, instead of protecting nontextual
substantive values, such as the right of privacy invoked in Roe.81 In
other words, Professor Ely was the minimalist of his own day, and
his defense of the judicial role in protecting powerless minorities
focused largely on reining courts in, rather than sending them forth
to save the world. In short, describing Professor Ely's methodology
as "perfectionist" seems deeply at odds with Professor Ely's own
vision and goals in setting forth that methodology.
Put another way, the suggestion that a new "minimalist"
approach should be substituted for an existing "perfectionist"
approach to Footnote Four smacks of calling for the minimalizing of
an already-minimalist methodology. One might criticize the
preceding sentence as designed merely to score rhetorical points;
more particularly, Professor Sunstein could fairly state that judges
can pour into any principle-including the unempoweredness
principle-an activist content. Fair enough. But the point remains.
A celebration of minimalism threatens to dilute the
unempoweredness principle in problematic ways. Professor
Sunstein, for example, must labor mightily to reconcile Brown v.
Board of Education2 with a minimalist viewpoint; 3 yet, as
Professor David Strauss has written, "everyone agrees that
Brown . . . was rightly decided.""4 No less important, Professor
Sunstein's characterization of the unempoweredness principle as
"perfectionist" 5 of itself heaps doubt on that principle, given his
basic thesis that judicial work, if properly done, will favor
minimalism over perfectionism. The point, again, is that words
matter. And the words offered by Professor Sunstein-including in
his handling of the Korematsu case 8 6-rub up hard against the
unempoweredness principle as it has been traditionally understood.
81 See ELY, supra note 2, at 4-5 (noting that the "central problem" with judicial review
lies in its "telling the people's elected representatives that they cannot govern as they'd like").
82 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
83 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 54, at 248 (noting that the decision can be defended on
minimalist grounds because it "was the culmination of a long line of cases").
84 David A. Strauss, What Is Constitutional Theory?, 87 CAL. L. REV. 581, 583 (1999).
8 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 54, at 31-34 (describing perfectionist theory).
86 See supra notes 61-76 and accompanying text.
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This is not to say that all would be lost, with respect to the
unempoweredness principle, in a minimalist world. Under
Professor Sunstein's own preferred brand of minimalism, for
example, precedent matters greatly." It should follow that most
minimalist jurists would neither abandon the unempoweredness
principle nor overturn past judicial rulings founded on it. Other
minimalists, however, may have other ideas, and one potential
approach readily suggests itself. Under it, courts would transform
the unempoweredness principle from one of constitutional law into
one of statutory interpretation. I turn now to this subject.
B. OF RECASTING THE UNEMPOWEREDNESS PRINCIPLE AS A RULE OF
"SOFT" CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
One important theme of the minimalist project concerns weaving
together the work of statutory and constitutional interpretation.""
Professor Sunstein, for example, praises the Court's Cold-War-era
ruling in Kent v. Dulles.9 There the issue was whether the
executive branch could deny a passport to a citizen who sought to
attend a conference in Finland on the ground that he was a member
of the Communist Party.9 ° In the end, the Court denied federal
officials the power to take this action, but it simultaneously
sidestepped the claimant's constitutional free-association, right-to-
travel, and nondelegation-doctrine arguments.9' The Court worked
this magic by holding that the controlling federal statute, properly
interpreted, did not authorize denial of a passport.92 The Court had
87 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 54, at 28-29 ("Minimalists celebrate the system of
precedent.... Many fundamentalists will not much hesitate to reject precedents that they
believe to be wrong. Minimalists are far more cautious about undoing the fabric of existing
law.").
' See, e.g., id, at 177-80 ("In a large number of cases ... the Court has required a clear
congressional statement before it would permit the executive to intrude on an interest that
has a plausible claim to constitutional protection."). See generally Dan T. Coenen, A
Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of
Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1604-18 (2001).
"9 357 U.S. 116 (1958); see SUNSTEIN, supra note 54, at 177-80 (commending Court's
minimalist approach in the case).
90 Kent, 357 U.S. at 117.
91 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 54, at 178-79 (noting that Court "left unanswered the larger
questions about the meaning of the Constitution").
92 Kent, 357 U.S. at 127-28 (reasoning that, in the past, Congress had approved the
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to engage in some major league gymnastics to reach this result
because the statute stated that passports should issue "under such
rules as the President shall designate and prescribe."93 Even so, the
Court found enough wiggle room in the text to bar passport denials
except for reasons that executive branch decisionmakers had
traditionally invoked.94 This result was supported by the " 'clear
statement' principle"9" under which a court, whenever fairly
possible, must avoid "passing upon . . . constitutional questions
pressed upon it for decision if it can do so by interpreting the statute
narrowly."96
Kent can be seen as an unempoweredness-principle case. The
individual targeted by the government was a political dissident, an
unabashed outsider, and a person pejoratively tarred with the label
"communist" in the Red Scare days of the 1950s. Even if Kent were
not viewed as such a case, however, the point that is coming is not
hard to miss: Flying the flag of minimalism, courts could shift
Footnote Four's special treatment of disempowered minorities away
from serving as a principle of hard-and-fast constitutional law to
instead serving, mainly or even entirely, as a principle of statutory
construction.
For three reasons, this outcome is not as unlikely as one might
initially think. First, in recent years, some scholars on the left have
backed the notion of abandoning judicial review altogether or
requiring rights-based rulings to be "soft" in nature in the sense that
those rulings would be legislatively reversible without recourse to
the constitutional amendment process.97 Analysts of this ilk might
well lodge no objection to recasting any particular constitutional
Secretary of State's refusal of passports only when questions existed with regard to
"citizenship or allegiance" or "criminal or unlawful conduct").
93 SUNSTEIN, supra note 54, at 178.
9 See supra note 92.
95 SUNSTEIN, supra note 54, at 180.
' Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
9' See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAXING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, at x
(1999) (generally advancing the argument for "populist constitutional law"). In particular,
Professor Tushnet has challenged the soundness of a special judicial role in protecting
discrete and insular minorities. See id. at 158-60; see also Mark Tushnet, Subconstitutional
Law: Supplement, Sham, or Substitute, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1871, 1872 (2001) ("Exactly
what extra value does democratic self-governance get from conclusive judicial review? Pretty
clearly, not all that much, in light of the scope of... subconstitutional doctrines.").
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principle-including the unempoweredness principle-into a mere
"clear statement" rule of statutory law.
Second, numerous doctrines already exist under which courts
safeguard constitutional values in ways that the political branches
can override in the absence of constitutional amendment;98
precedent thus leaves an opening for arguing that the embrace of a
"soft" rule in this context would comport with a time-honored
judicial approach. Third, as leading scholars have observed, the
Supreme Court (albeit without saying so) already has embraced a
canon of statutory interpretation (apart from and in addition to the
"constitutional avoidance" principle invoked in the Kent case) that
favors so-called "Carolene groups."99
Pointing to this trifecta of modern developments, a dedicated
minimalist might well say something like this:
Hey! Courts are already protecting discrete and insular
minorities with subconstitutional rules of statutory
interpretation, and cases like Kent show that judges can
be plenty creative and ambitious in doing so. So why not
go with just a rule of statutory interpretation here?
That's "democracy-forcing"-which is something we
9 For a full-scale treatment of this subject, see generally Coenen, supra note 88
(describing numerous judicial doctrines that render constitutionally inspired rulings
effectively reversible by political branches); Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural
Due Process, and Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281 (2002)
(documenting recent decisions in this area and denominating relevant doctrines as
constitutional who, why, when, and how rules).
" See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 602 (1992) (explaining
that the Court, in "[r]esponding to the same concerns that arguably have inspired the Court's
willingness to subject certain 'suspect classifications' to stringent equal protection
analysis,... interpret[ed] ambiguous statutes to benefit 'discrete and insular minorities,'"
or"Carolene groups"); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1032 (1989) (claiming that various interpretations of statutes reflect
"special equal protection scrutiny applied by the Court" to protect "Carolene groups"); Cass
R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 473 (1989)
(stating that "[aiggressive construction of ambiguous statutes designed to protect
disadvantaged groups provides a way for courts to protect the constitutional norm of equal
protection in a less intrusive manner"); see also Coenen, supra note 88, at 1612-13 (observing
that courts have used a "constitutionally inspired interpretive norm that favors so-called
'Carolene groups'.. . to protect (even in the absence of substantial constitutional questions)
'discrete and insular minorities' ").
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minimalists like.' ° A statutory canon designed to
protect Carolene groups is good enough for me.
As usual, there is much to be said about all of this. Of particular
interest is the possibility that our hypothetical minimalist's
endorsement of a clear-statement approach might draw critiques
from both the right and the left. I turn now to those possible
responses.
1. Critiques from the Left. Does transforming Footnote Four's
special treatment of discrete and insular minorities from a "hard"
rule of constitutional law into a "soft" rule of statutory
interpretation make good sense? One can almost hear Milner Ball
howling out against the suggestion. The basic reason why is
obvious. The essential point of Footnote Four is that legislative
processes do not take fair account of the interests of unempowered
groups. It thus makes no sense to protect the interests of those
groups simply by requiring clarity from the legislative branch. To
do so is to let the fox guard the henhouse. It is to create a
"democracy-forcing" rule in the very setting where democracy does
not work. If legislative officials are not to be trusted when dealing
with the interests of Carolene groups, then they are not to be
trusted, and this is so whether those legislative officials speak with
punctilious elocution or with garbled tongues.
Some minimalists might accept this critique but nonetheless offer
an alternative proposal for reform. On their view, courts should not
abandon hard-and-fast review altogether. Instead such review
should take hold in those cases that involve the most blatant
infringements of the unempoweredness principle, while in other
cases only the clear-statement rule of statutory interpretation
should protect Carolene groups. Notably, Professor Sunstein
himself never advocates a wholesale repudiation of the Carolene
Products methodology as a tool for invalidating statutes (however
clear they might be) when those statutes demonstrably trench too
"o Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term: Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REV. 4,7 (1996) (praising minimalism as "democracy-forcing" in part
because "it promotes reason-giving and ensures that certain important decisions are made
by democratically accountable actors").
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much on the interests of distinctively protected groups. 101 He might
even say that a Carolene Products-based clear-statement rule,
coupled with a fixed level of full-fledged constitutional protection,
safeguards protected groups to the greatest extent. On this view, a
strong (though penetrable) front line of defense is provided by the
clear-statement principle, while a impregnable bulwark is supplied
by a hard-and-fast constitutional rule that protects powerless
minorities in the cases of greatest urgency.
Patrons of the more traditional approach to Footnote Four will
greet such reasoning with skepticism. They will worry about hidden
motives, and they will fear unintended results. They will wonder,
in particular, how this "cases of greatest urgency" conception of the
irreducible minimum of protection provided by the Carolene
Products principle will play out in the real world. Their main
concern will be that, if judges come to see their Carolene Products
role as largely one of requiring clear statements, they may soften
their resolve to protect minorities with irreversible rulings of true
constitutional law. Skeptics on the left will acknowledge that
reasonable people will often disagree about whether political
decisionmakers have dealt with Carolene groups in an intolerable
way. But what is "intolerable"? The concern will be that a two-
track approach will tend to shift attitudes toward tolerating more
legislative behavior than was minimally tolerable before.
In short, many on the left will find unacceptable any
"minimalization" of traditional, non-reversible judicial use of the
unempoweredness principle by placing a new and heightened
emphasis on tools of statutory construction. Old-fashioned hard-
and-fast use of the principle, after all, generated Brown and all that
came in its wake. For lawyers nurtured on the justness of those
decisions, any reformulation of the principle said to underlie them
will be a tough sell. 2
2. Critiques from the Right. There are two main lines of criticism
of clear-statement-based protections of Carolene groups that might
'0' See id. at 36-42 (discussing connection between minimalism and "the project of
Carolene Products broadly understood").
102 See Coenen, supra note 98, at 1889-90 (questioning Professor Tushnet's attempt to
reconcile Brown with abandonment of legislatively irreversible judicial review).
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come from the right. The first has its roots in text-centered
approaches to statutory interpretation. The second focuses on
concerns that "liberal"judges will manipulate canons of construction
to achieve desired results.
a. The Text-Centered Critique. Analysts with a textualist
bent might question any clear-statement rule designed to protect
Carolene groups because it gives meaning to statutory language on
grounds unrelated to the statutory language itself.' Justice Scalia,
for example, has argued that courts should focus on the words of the
legislature to discern legislative meaning, directing primary
attention to principles like ejusdem generis, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, and noscitur a sociis.104 He questions, for example,
the notion that courts should honor the canon that favors
interpreting statutes in light of the common law on the ground that
it invites result-oriented reasoning.0 5 Building on these notions,
one might expect committed textualists to look skeptically at a free-
floating interpretive principle designed to favor the interests of
Carolene groups. 1°6
Milner Ball's focus on The Federalist suggests that there may be
an "originalist" rejoinder to this would-be textualist critique. And,
sure enough, there is. In The Federalist No. 78 Alexander Hamilton
emphasized that "it is not with a view to infractions of the
constitution only that the independence of the judges may be an
essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humours in
the society."'0 7 He continued:
These sometimes extend no farther than to the injury of
the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by
unjust and partial laws. Here also the firmness of the
l03 Cf ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 28 (1997) (suggesting that
"artificial rules increase the unpredictability, if not the arbitrariness, ofjudicial decisions").
104 Id. at 25-26 (discussing canons of construction).
'o See id. at 17-18 (arguing these approaches allow judges to write their own desires and
objectives into law).
106 This is not to say that Justice Scalia himself would take such a skeptical view,
although (as the text suggests) some of his observations might point in that direction. A full-
scale study of Justice Scalia's view of statutory interpretation is well beyond the scope of this
Article.
107 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 528.
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judicial magistracy is of vast importance in mitigating
the severity, and confining the operation of such laws.
It not only serves to moderate the immediate mischiefs
of those which may have been passed, but it operates as
a check upon the legislative body in passing them; who,
perceiving that obstacles to the success of an iniquitous
intention are to be expected from the scruples of the
courts, are in a manner compelled by the very motives of
the injustice they meditate, to qualify their attempts. 0 8
Translation: Whenever possible, courts should act to confine "the
operation of ... laws"-that is, interpret them narrowly-when
those laws threaten to harm "particular classes of citizens"-that is
disfavored groups-by treating them in an "unjust and partial"
way-that is, in a way that is not impartial. These words of
Hamilton lend strong support to the clear-statement rule of
statutory interpretation invoked by modern courts to favor Carolene
groups. At the very least, the passage cuts against the notion that
there is no place for a non-linguistic equal-treatment-based canon
of statutory construction in American law.
b. The Subterfuge Critique. An alternative challenge to any
clear-statement rule that favors Carolene groups derives from
assessments like the following:
"[C]lever judges"... invoke [clear-statement and related
rules] when they predict that the legislature will be
unable to enact legislation that contravenes the judges'
personal preferences. They thus " 'rig' a desired
substantive outcome." They pretend to be exercising
judicial restraint by declaring that the legislature may
reinstate an invalidated law, all the while knowing that,
as a practical matter, it cannot.'0 9
108 id.
" Dan T. Coenen, Structural Review, Pseudo-Second-Look Decision Making, and the Risk
of Diluting Constitutional Liberty, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1881, 1882 (2001) (quoting
Professor Mark V. Tushnet and Professor Laurence Tribe).
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Building on this logic, critics from the right might see a clear-
statement rule designed to protect Carolene groups as a stealthy
tool of judicial activism. Such a rule, on this view, operates as a
vehicle for permanently dislodging appropriate legislative
judgments behind a smokescreen of feigned judicial restraint.
I doubt this critique has merit, and at least one seemingly
credible witness seems to support my assessment. During a recent
talk at this law school, Justice Stephen Breyer reported that judges
typically write opinions that set forth the real reasons for their
decisions."' If he is right, then worries about strategic misuse of
clear-statement doctrines and other "soft" constitutional rules are
misplaced.
In the end, I suspect that a meaningful two-track approach to
protecting Carolene groups-coupling a clear-statement mandate
with an undiluted quantum of constitutional protection-gets things
about right. Milner Ball would be quick to add that courts must not
reduce irreducible protections simply because an alternative tool of
statutory interpretation is on the scene. To do so, he would be sure
to point out, risks departing from the sort of "searching judicial
inquiry" referenced by the words of Footnote Four itself.
C. OF POSSIBLE ABANDONMENT
We have seen two directions in which the future of Footnote Four
might lie. First, courts could mute the call for special treatment of
discrete and insular minorities by moving toward a more minimalist
role. Second (and more particularly), courts could reshape the
unempoweredness principle to work more (or entirely) as a "soft"
clear-statement rule of statutory interpretation, rather than as a
hard-and-fast rule of "true" constitutional law."' There is another
possibility: The Supreme Court might junk the unempoweredness
principle altogether.
The history of Footnote Four contains elements, which may be
surprising to some observers, that make this possibility more real
110 Justice Stephen Breyer, Address at the University of Georgia School of Law (Jan. 20,
2007).
"' See Coenen, supra note 88, at 1578-80 (describing "on-or-off' judicial rules).
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than might first meet the eye. Potential surprise number one is
that Footnote Four itself was not joined by a majority of the
Court. 112  Potential surprise number two is that-although the
Carolene Products case came down in 1938" 3-a majority of the
Court never actually cited its language about discrete and insular
minorities until 1973.114 Potential surprise number three is that,
when the Court, in Graham v. Richardson,"5 finally did invoke the
unempoweredness principle to protect legal aliens against state
discrimination, it did not rely exclusively on discrete-and-insular-
minority reasoning; instead, the Court simultaneously emphasized
the distinctive federal role (and resulting non-state role) in the field
of immigration." 6 Potential surprise number four is that the Court
has not expressly relied on Footnote Four's discussion of minorities
very often ever since. Indeed, apart from treatments of non-
citizens," 7 Justices have tended to cite Footnote Four only in the
context of rejecting the claims of minority groups."' Of particular
112 See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 656 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting
that only four Justices joined Footnote Four).
113 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
114 See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
1 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
11 See id. at 377 (noting that federal government has "broad constitutional powers in
determining what aliens shall be admitted to the United States ... and the terms and
conditions of their naturalization" (quoting Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410,
419 (1948))).
.17 See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 21 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that
"alienage classifications.., demand close judicial scrutiny"); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291,
302-03 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that state statute limiting appointment of
members to state police force to U.S. citizens should be held unconstitutional under strict
judicial scrutiny); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 17-22 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that aliens should be deemed part of "discrete and insular minority" only to the
extent that they are "categorized by a factor beyond their control"); Sugarman, 413 U.S. 634,
642 (1973) (noting that "standard of review of statutes that treat aliens differently from
citizens requires a greater degree of precision"); id. at 655-57 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(discussing and questioning Footnote Four's application to aliens).
118 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It is
hard to consider women a 'discrete and insular' minorit[y] unable to employ the 'political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon,' when they constitute a majority of the electorate.");
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 468-70 (1991) (noting, and relying on, Court's refusal to
apply Carolene Products-based strict scrutiny to discrimination against aliens in regulatory
areas that fall "firmly within a State's constitutional prerogatives"); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (concluding "mental retardation" is not
"classification calling for more exacting standard ofjudicial review"); O'Bannon v. Town Court
Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 800-01 n.8 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring injudgment) (raising
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importance, the Court has rejected Footnote Four-based
reasoning-built directly on the ruminations of Professor Ely"19-to
the effect that race-based affirmative action programs ordinarily
should survive constitutional attack.
120
The foregoing points are hardly inconsequential. Suppose, for
example, that you are a Supreme Court Justice who wishes to argue
that a special attentiveness to "discrete and insular minorities" has
no proper role to play outside of cases that involve discrimination
based on race or ethnicity. This history would at least give you
something to say. So would Justice Rehnquist's expressions of
concern about the inevitable subjectivity of what he called a" 'ward
of the Court' approach to equal protection." 2 ' As he put the point
in Sugarman v. Dougall:
Our society, consisting of over 200 million individuals of
multitudinous origins, customs, tongues, beliefs, and
cultures is, to say the least, diverse. It would hardly
take extraordinary ingenuity for a lawyer to find
"insular and discrete" minorities at every turn in the
road. Yet, unless the Court can precisely define and
constitutionally justify both the terms and analysis it
uses, these decisions today stand for the proposition that
questions about whether nursing home patients meet the standard of Footnote Four); Mass.
Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (determining that "old age does not define
a 'discrete and insular group' "); see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
495 (1989) (observing that "one aspect of the judiciary's role under the Equal Protection
Clause is to protect 'discrete and insular minorities' "but upholding challenge to contractor
set-aside program designed to help historically excluded groups).
119 See ELY, supra note 2, at 61-62 (discussing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978)).
120 Compare Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (stating, in an
affirmative-action context, that "[flederal racial classifications ... must serve a compelling
governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest"), with Regents
of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (stating that "racial classifications designed to further remedial
purposes 'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives' "). See also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003)
(Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (stating that"government decisionmakers may properly distinguish
between policies of exclusion and inclusion .... [Wihere race is considered 'for the purpose
of achieving equality,' no automatic proscription is in order.") (quoting Norwalk Core v.
Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 932 (2d Cir. 1968)).
121 Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 657 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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the Court can choose a "minority" it "feels" deserves
"solicitude" and thereafter prohibit the States from
classifying that "minority" differently from the
"majority."122
There is, of course, even more to say against the unempoweredness
principle if one embraces a strict show-me-the-specifics originalist
methodology. 1
23
Notwithstanding these potential critiques, there is much to say
in support of the traditional unempoweredness-principle approach.
For example, while it is true that the Court did not cite Footnote
Four from 1938 to 1973,4 Professor Ely's book shows that its
philosophy in fact underpinned a great portion of the Warren
Court's work. 125  Constitutional text also lends support to an
expansive conception of the unempoweredness principle for the
simple reason that the text of the Equal Protection Clause (unlike,
for example, the Fifteenth Amendment) does not limit its reach to
race-based and other enumerated forms of discrimination. 26 Justice
Rehnquist's argument based on judicial subjectivity is subject to
counterattack on it-comes-with-the-territory reasoning, bolstered by
materials generated by Justice Rehnquist himself. 27  And, for
122 Id.
123 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 54, at 63-65 (describing Constitution's reach under
originalist methodology and suggesting, for example, that under this approach
"[d] iscrimination by states on the basis of sex would be entirely acceptable").
124 See supra notes 90-115 and accompanying text.
125 ELY, supra note 2, at 75.
126 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."), with U.S. CONST. amend. XV,
§ 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.").
127 In United States v. Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court in invalidating
a federal statute on the ground it exceeded the commerce power because it regulated
"noncommercial" activity. 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995). Responding to a challenge based on the
obliqueness of this principle, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:
Admittedly, a determination whether an intrastate activity is commercial
or noncommercial may in some cases result in legal uncertainty. But, so
long as Congress' authority is limited to those powers enumerated in the
Constitution, and so long as those enumerated powers are interpreted as
having judicially enforceable outer limits, congressional legislation under
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reasons already offered, originalist thought lends aid to the
unempoweredness principle, at least if one stands ready to link up
the broad text of the Fourteenth Amendment with themes of
minority protection at the heart of The Federalist.
12
Not surprisingly, the current Court's so-called "liberals" remain
adherents of traditional notions of the unempoweredness
principle. 129 In addition, both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas
have drawn upon the principle in high-profile opinions. Pointing to
the numerical majority of female voters in evaluating the single-sex
military school at issue in United States v. Virginia,30 Justice Scalia
wrote that "normal, rational-basis review of sex-based classifications
would be much more in accord with the genesis of heightened
standards ofjudicial review, the famous footnote in United States v.
Carolene Products."3' From this passage, however, one cannot
glean much information about Justice Scalia's overarching view of
the unempoweredness principle; in particular, he did not have to
endorse that principle to argue that-even if it applied-women
should not be viewed as an underempowered group.
A similar analysis applies to Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion
in Kelo v. City of New London."'3 There the issue was whether a
the Commerce Clause always will engender 'legal uncertainty.'
Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist's comments on the Commerce Clause goose would seem to apply
as well to the Equal Protection gander.
128 See supra notes 12-32 and accompanying text.
1 See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 947-48 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing
that "history of exclusion from state politics" calls for "vigilant judicial inspection to protect
minority voters"); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 555-57 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (arguing that courts have "special obligation to protect the rights of
prisoners" who constitute a "discrete and insular minority").
130 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
131 Id. at 575 (citation omitted). In Justice Scalia's opinion, "[i] t is hard to consider women
a 'discrete and insular minorit[y]' unable to employ the 'political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon,' when they constitute a majority of the electorate." Id. For other ruminations
by Justice Scalia on the unempoweredness principle, see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
602-03 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that homosexuals' political power is
illustrated by fact that "Texas is one of the few remaining States that criminalize private,
consensual homosexual acts"), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645-46 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("[Blecause those who engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in
disproportionate numbers in certain communities,... have high disposable income,.., and,
of course, care about homosexual-rights issues much more ardently than the public at large,
they possess political power much greater than their numbers, both locally and statewide.").
132 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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city's condemnation of private land, for later incorporation into a
private firm's tax-base-enhancing economic development project,
comported with the "public use" language of the Fifth
Amendment.'33 Along with much else, Justice Thomas observed
that:
Allowing the government to take property solely for
public purposes is bad enough, but extending the concept
of public purpose to encompass any economically
beneficial goal guarantees that these losses will fall
disproportionately on poor communities. Those
communities are not only systematically less likely to
put their lands to the highest and best social use, but
are also the least politically powerful. If ever there were
justification for intrusive judicial review of
constitutional provisions that protect "discrete and
insular minorities,".., surely that principle would apply
with great force to the powerless groups and individuals
the Public Use Clause protects. The deferential
standard this Court has adopted for the Public Use
Clause is therefore deeply perverse. It encourages
"those citizens with disproportionate influence and
power in the political process, including large
corporations and development firms," to victimize the
weak.'34
Read for all it is worth, Justice Thomas's reasoning invites an
expansion of the unempoweredness principle beyond its present-day
protection of nonmarital children, 135 lawful aliens, 13' and children of
Id. at 472. The so-called Takings Clause provides: "nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
134 Id. at 521-22 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also id. at 522 (noting that
"[uirban renewal projects have long been associated with the displacement of blacks; '[iun
cities across the country, urban renewal came to be known as 'Negro removal' ' "(citation
omitted)).
"3 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (holding that state statute's six-year statute of
limitations for paternity actions did not withstand heightened security under Equal
Protection Clause).
136 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holding state welfare laws conditioning
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unlawful aliens who confront the denial of free public education.137
Indeed, tracking themes put forward by Milner Ball more than three
decades ago, this passage offers hope for a principle aimed more
generally at protecting the "poor," the "weak," and "the least
politically powerful."
Will Justice Thomas or others take Footnote Four in this
direction? The Kelo dissent by itself provides little cause to think so,
in part because Justice Thomas consistently centered his discussion
on the Takings Clause and the specialized implications of its "public
use" text.3 8 No less important, Justice Thomas neither had to nor
did embrace a highly generalized conception of the
unempoweredness principle. Rather, he observed that the facts of
Kelo presented special problems "[if ever there were justification for
intrusive judicial review"'39 under the principle of Carolene
Products. Justice Thomas's analysis thus contains one big "if." In
Kelo, as in United States v. Virginia, the dissenters did not have to
endorse the Stone/Warren/Ely/Ball principle that courts have a
special role to play in protecting discrete and insular minorities. In
fact they went no further than assuming for purposes of argument
that such a principle exists.
If push comes to shove, what will Justices Scalia and Thomas do
with the unempoweredness principle? In particular, will they follow
the trajectory of the Court's past rulings by recognizing the
principle's application to groups identified by characteristics apart
from race and ethnicity? Perhaps not, given an oft-voiced preference
for bringing a show-me-with-specificity originalist perspective to
constitutional decisionmaking."4 ° From such a perspective, there is
probably not much to be said for affording special protection to
aliens, nonmarital children, or women under the Equal Protection
benefits on citizenship violated Equal Protection Clause).
137 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (invalidating state tuition requirement imposed on
children of undocumented aliens).
138 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 506-07 (arguing, for example, that the majority replaced the "Public
Use Clause" with a" 'public purpose' Clause").
139 Id. at 521 (emphasis added).
140 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,566 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing,
in the equal protection context, that majority's reasoning "ignores the history of our people").
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Clause.' Yet it is precisely those groups that the Court in fact has
protected under the banner of the unempoweredness principle.'42
Another cautionary note comes from what might seem like an
unlikely source-a concurring opinion in a dormant Commerce
Clause case. In West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,'43 the issue was
whether a state could simultaneously (1) impose a tax on all milk
sales made by wholesalers in Massachusetts and (2) return the
proceeds of that taxing program to in-state milk producers.'44
Embracing an analysis that highlighted the political powerlessness
of out-of-state producers,'45 Justice Stevens concluded for a five-
Justice majority that the payments made to in-state operators
amounted to a de facto "rebate" in violation of the Constitution's
strong ban on taxing measures that discriminate against interstate
commerce. 41 In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia (joined by
Justice Thomas) went out of his way to disassociate himself from
Justice Stevens's opinion, reasoning that its political-process
reasoning would logically (and wrongly) invalidate an affirmative
state subsidy that favored in-state interests.'47 In a passage
potentially rich with meaning, he added that "[a]nalysis of interest
group participation in the political process may serve many useful
purposes, but serving as a basis for interpreting the dormant
Commerce Clause is not one of them."148
Why does this passage about the dormant Commerce Clause shed
light on how Justices Scalia and Thomas might in the future look at
discrete and insular minorities? The answer is simple: Because
concerns about exclusion from operative political processes are just
141 SUNsTEIN, supra note 54, at 63-65 (noting, for example, that under originalist
approach, discrimination by states and national government against women would be
constitutional).
142 See, e.g., Plyer, 457 U.S. at 230 (invalidating state tuition requirement imposed on
children of undocumented aliens).
1 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
144 Id. at 188.
1 Id. at 196 n.l1 (noting that effect of pricing order is to place out-of-state product at
'substantial commercial disadvantage because of discriminatory tax treatment").
'46 Id. at 197.
147 See id. at 208-09 (Scalia, J., concurring injudgment) (noting that"[i]t seems to me that
a state subsidy would clearly be invalid under any formulation of the Court's guiding
principle," given that subsides favor in-state over out-of-state producers).
148 Id. at 212 (quoting id. at 215 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
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as surely at the heart of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine as they
are at the heart of the unempoweredness principle. Indeed, in
justifying the discrete-and-insular-minority principle in Footnote
Four itself, Chief Justice Stone specifically relied on the Court's
dormant Commerce Clause decision, handed down just nine weeks
earlier, in South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell
Bros.'49 And there is strong reason to say he should have. As
Professor Ely observed:
The Commerce Clause of Artice I, Section 8 provides
simply that Congress shall have the power to regulate
commerce among the states. But early on the Supreme
Court gave this provision a self-operating dimension as
well, one growing out of the same need to protect the
politically powerless .... Thus, for example, early in
the nineteenth century the Court indicated that a state
could not subject goods produced out of state to taxes it
did not impose on goods produced locally. By thus
constitutionally binding the interests of out-of-state
manufacturers to those of local manufactures
represented in the legislature, it provided political
insurance that the taxes imposed on the former would
not rise to a prohibitive or even an unreasonable level. 5 °
The post-Barnwell cases are entirely clear on this point,'5 ' which is
why (for example) the Court in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co.'52 could reject a dormant Commerce Clause challenge in part
because "[tihe existence of major in-state interests adversely
... S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938).
150 ELY, supra note 2, at 83-84.
151 See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 408-13 (3d ed. 2000)
(collecting many cases); Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965, 1005 nn.207 & 208 (1997) (same); Richard B. Collins, Economic
Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43,67 (1988) (noting that "many opinions
since Barnwell have mentioned local political restraint as a factor in dormant commerce
power analysis"); Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 217,
251-52 (1995) ("The political process leading to the enactment of laws that discriminate
against outside commerce is an important theme of the Court's decisions . ..
152 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
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affected by the Act is a powerful safeguard against legislative
abuse."1
53
The bottom line is not hard to behold: If Justices Scalia and
Thomas are troubled by the long-recognized political-process
moorings of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, there is
reason to suspect they will be troubled as well by the long-
recognized political-process moorings of protecting unempowered
minorities under Footnote Four. To be sure, they might ultimately
deem the Equal Protection Clause and dormant Commerce Clause
to be very different in this regard. There is, however, no denying
that courts long have viewed the dormancy doctrine and the
unempoweredness principle as kindred concepts jointly tethered to
the justness of protecting deserving political outsiders.
What about Chief Justice Roberts? During his confirmation
hearings, Senator Richard Durbin asked the nominee to reflect on
his views "when it comes to expanding our personal freedom."'54 In
his response, then-Judge Roberts stated:
I had someone ask me in this process - I don't
remember who it was, but somebody asked me, you
know, "Are you going to be on the side of the little guy?"
And you obviously want to give an immediate answer,
but, as you reflect on it, if the Constitution says that the
little guy should win, the little guy's going to win in
court before me. But if the Constitution says that the
big guy should win, well, then the big guy's going to win,
because my obligation is to the Constitution. That's the
oath. 155
These words may not carry the ring of a Footnote Four
enthusiast. In fairness to Chief Justice Roberts, however, what he
said is entirely correct. The Court must apply the rules of the
Constitution in evenhanded fashion to little guys and big guys alike.
163 Id. at 473 n.17 (citation omitted).
1 Transcript of Record from Judge John Roberts Confirmation Hearings (Sept. 15, 2005),
http://www.asksam.com/ebooks/releases.asp?file=JGRHearing.ask&dn=Day%204%20%2d
%20Durbin%20%2d%2oCore%2OValues.
155 Id.
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But the vital question remains: What rules does the Constitution
establish to be thus applied? If one rule is that courts must direct
a "more searching judicial inquiry" at laws that disadvantage
unempowered groups," 6 then that is a rule to which the Court in all
cases must adhere. For more than a half century, this rule in fact
has been a guiding star in the constitutional firmament. And if the
work of Milner Ball teaches us anything, it is that that rule should
continue to operate in that way.
V. THE UNEMPOWEREDNESS PRINCIPLE AND MILNER BALL
It is fitting that Milner's own story in the law centers, in a very
real way, around Footnote Four. Ron Ellington, who taught Milner
thirty-seven years ago, tells of the "epiphany" that occurred when
Milner first encountered Justice Stone's treatment of discrete and
insular minorities: "I can still picture the excitement in Milner's
face," Professor Ellington writes, "as he saw instantly the potential
in this opening for crafting a principled way for courts to protect the
rights of minorities.... .""'
Given this reaction, it is not surprising that Milner turned his
attention to Footnote Four as a young academic, arguing in the first
full-fledged law review article he wrote (as we have seen) that
judges should fully honor its promise. In the classroom, too, Milner
breathed life into the value of including the excluded. Of particular
significance was his work with Native American law. In a time
when the subject was almost unnoticed in the profession, Milner
insisted on its rightful place in the curriculum. Later, he similarly
insisted on offering a course on Race in the Law. And most
important, he personally undertook the heavy lifting required to
make these courses a reality.
True to his views of inclusion and openness, Milner-as David
Shipley has written-"was doing interdisciplinary work long before
most schools started touting their interdisciplinary initiatives."'5 8
"u United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
1C7 C. Ronald Ellington, Milner Ball: My Student, My Teacher, 41 GA. L. REV. 749, 750
(2007).
" David E. Shipley, Milner S. Ball: Proof That One Professor Can Make a Difference, 41
GA. L. REV. 753, 753 (2007).
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Much of this work has concerned scripture, but that fact only begins
to capture Milner's extraordinary range. To provide only one small
illustration of the point, Milner's 1974 article on the
unempoweredness principle drew upon principles of "cybernetics."5 9
At every opportunity, Milner has worked to bring women,
minorities, and diverse voices into our community, counseling
always against the natural tendency to value life experiences and
outlooks that fit comfortably within one's own frame of reference.
161
In the same spirit, in his time away from work, Milner has thrown
himself into protecting the interests of marginalized persons.
Sometimes this work had a national significance, as when he dealt
with land claims asserted by aboriginal Hawaiians. 6' More often,
Milner has rolled up his sleeves and worked within our own
community. He has labored, and continues to labor, on behalf of the
homeless community, helpless children, victims of sexual violence,
persons struggling with addictions, those who have disabilities, and,
always unstintingly, the poor.
Milner has done this work selflessly, but with an insistent and
demanding voice. A year ago, at Milner's seventieth birthday party,
my wife Sally offered a toast that focused on this character trait.
Sally's toast told a story that began when our area's United Way
agency unexpectedly cut off funding to an organization named
Community Connection, which helps meet the needs of the poor and
others by providing information-and-referral services. According to
Sally's account:
[Milner] set up a called meeting with the United Way
board. Community Connection's director, Tim Johnson,
159 Ball, supra note 6, at 1071.
160 See generally Milner S. Ball, The Legal Academy and Minority Scholars, 103 HARV. L
REV. 1855 (1990) (discussing importance of work of minority scholars).
"' See generally Kekuni Blaisdell, Ka Ho'Okolokolonui Kanaka Maoli: The Peoples'
International Tribunal, Hawaii 1993, FOURTH WORLD BULLETIN: ISSUES IN INDIGENOUS LAW
ANDPOLITICS, Dec. 1993, available at http://carbon.cudenver.edu/publicfwc/Issue6/hawaii-1.
html (discussing 1993 International Peoples' Tribunal in Hawaii on which Ball served as
judge on issues including claims that U.S. government wrongfully annexed territory and
committed other offenses against native Hawaiians). See also MILNER S. BALL, CALLED BY
STORIES: BIBLICAL SAGAS AND THEIR CHALLENGE FOR LAw 97 (2000) (discussing 1993
International Peoples' Tribunal in Hawaii).
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and I came along, and it was a scene I will always
remember. Milner entered the room with a scowl on his
face, knitted eyebrows, and glaring eyes. After Tim and
I made brief and polite presentations, Milner leaned
forward, glowering at the board members across the
table. The room suddenly became deathly quiet. With
an intensity I had never witnessed before in Milner, or
anyone, he proceeded to assail, attack, berate, castigate,
criticize, denounce, excoriate, flay, flog, lambaste,
pummel, rebuke, reprimand, scathe, scold, shellac, slam,
slash, smear, thrash, upbraid, wallop, and whip those
poor, now trembling, cowering board members ....
The next day we learned that Community
Connection's funding from United Way was not only
completely restored but increased for the upcoming
year. 1
62
What Sally calls the "Wrath of Milner" is indeed a powerful thing,
primarily because it gathers force from its purely altruistic use in
pursuing the interests of other people.' 63 Ron Ellington writes:
"Always a friend, Milner was not always easy on me as a dean."'64
Ron knew something of the "Wrath of Milner."
Throughout his professional life, Milner has worked tirelessly to
give opportunity and impetus to students drawn to public interest
law. He singlehandedly erected-with no model to follow-our law
school's Public Interest Practicum, a pioneering effort designed to
162 See infra APPENDIX A.
" I pause here to mention a related point that is, perhaps, both the most obvious and the
most important one to be made. Milner's "charity for all" does not come from nowhere. It is
in large measure the product of a deeply fulfilling family life that reaches back to Milner's
earliest years. Milner's concern for others finds particular nourishment in the treasured
relationships he shares with his three children, their spouses, and his five beautiful
grandchildren. At the center of it all, of course, stands the indescribably close relationship
he shares with his life partner, June. Ned Spurgeon quotes Milner as once saying that the
two of them are "joined at the hip" and speaks accurately of their "long and wonderful
marriage." Edward D. Spurgeon, A Tribute to Milner S. Ball, 41 GA. L. REV. 757, 758 (2007).
For me, theirs is a "marriage" in the richest and most paradoxical sense of the word-a sort
of communion of everything between two vibrantly independent individuals. I think first of
my own parents when I contemplate what a healthy life partnership can be; among the small
handful of those I think of next are Milner and June.
164 Ellington, supra note 157, at 751.
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offer students client-centered work and study opportunities outside
the criminal-law setting. Milner then fought to build on this
program, and he succeeded richly in that effort. Today, the
University of, Georgia also offers students opportunities to
participate in a family violence clinic, a land use clinic, a mediation
clinic, an environmental law practicum, a special education
practicum, and a spectrum of "externships" that range from the
representation of immigrants through the Catholic Charities of
Atlanta, to death-penalty-related research for the Southern Center
for Human Rights, to poverty-law work with Georgia Legal Services
and Atlanta Legal Aid. All of these programs exist in no small
measure due to Milner's efforts, but his greatest contribution has
come from the example and counsel he has provided to individual
students. As Dean Rebecca White rightly observes: "I have
witnessed through my years on the faculty Milner's influence on his
students and have seen them transformed by his passion and
vision." "'
On the academic side, Milner's work took a new direction in the
latter years of his career, as he focused on the powerful role of
narratives in culture, in ethics, and in law. Such books as Called by
Stories: Biblical Sagas and Their Challenge for Law 6' and Lying
Down Together: Law, Metaphor, and Theology" 7 illustrate the
point, as do articles like Just Stories,6 ' and Lawyers in Context:
Moses, Brandeis and the A.B.A. 169
As if all this were not enough, seven years ago, Milner undertook
a new adventure in his professional life. He immersed himself in
the day-to-day work of our Public Defender Clinic, representing
indigent criminal defendants. In doing so, Milner again lived out
his commitment to the principles of Footnote Four by offering his
time and talent to those who may be the most powerless among us.
Milner, however, also sought something more in this work. He
" Rebecca H. White, Milner Ball: Mentor, Teacher, and Friend, 41 GA. L. REV. 743, 745
(2007).
166 BALL, supra note 161.
167 MILNER S. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY (1985).
168 Milner S. Ball, Just Stories, 12 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 37 (2000).
169 Milner S. Ball, Lawyers in Context: Moses, Brandeis and the A.B.A., 14 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POLY 321 (2000).
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sought to learn, and learn from, the stories of others-the true
stories of those involved in the everyday operation of our system of
justice-and to bring those stories back to his work as teacher,
scholar, and citizen.
What is there to learn from Milner's own story? There is
inspiration here, even if most of us lack the talent and energy
needed to put together a life-narrative that matches this one in
richness. There is a lesson about what is possible, including for the
legal academic. Milner, after all, has shown us that a law professor
can be not only a teacher and researcher, but a hands-on participant
in the practical world of lawyers, institutions, and ordinary people,
as well as a conduit that connects one's students to that world. In
Milner's story, there is much food for thought about the linkages
among law, life, and spirituality, for at the root of Milner's being is
an abiding (though thoroughly non-judgmental and non-
exclusionary) religious faith. Perhaps most of all, there is a
powerful challenge posed: For those of us who espouse the ideals of
Footnote Four, what moral responsibilities does that commitment
carry as we go about our day-to-day lives? As I grapple with that
question in my own life, I consider often the story of Milner Ball.
VI. CONCLUSION
Footnote Four has a story, too. It is a story that reaches back
much earlier than 1938; indeed, as we have seen, it draws
nourishment from the founding period itself, and particularly from
lessons taught by The Federalist Papers. In the years more
immediately leading up to 1938, the forces that gave birth to the
footnote gained strength from the real-world suffering of African-
Americans and other racial minorities, 7 ° Seventh Day Adventists
and other religious minorities,17' and political dissidents of all
170 See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 1941 (1927) (holding statute prohibiting
African-Americans from voting in primary election violated Fourteenth Amendment).
171 See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (holding that law
prohibiting religious proselytizing without permit violated Fourteenth Amendment); Pierce
v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 532 (1925) (holding that law requiring compulsory public
education without option of private religious education was unconstitutional); In re King, 46
F. 905, 918 (W.D. Tenn. 1891) (holding that Seventh Day Adventist was properly convicted
for violating Sabbath law).
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stripes.172 The burdens borne by these and other excluded groups
revealed that the ringing promise of "equal protection" remained
unfulfilled in the America of that day, as it remains in this day as
well.
The post-1938 story of Footnote Four is the story of a vital
American institution-the federal Judiciary-giving marginalized
persons a greater measure of protection and voice. Again, the roots
of this story lay in the original Constitution, particularly its
insistence on the Judiciary's independence from popular pressures
and political meddling. The story also has involved real-world
courage displayed by real-world judges, lawyers, and ordinary
citizens, including Milner himself.
Through all of the story of Footnote Four runs a spirit of basic
fairness and broad inclusion-much the same spirit that has set the
theme of Milner Ball's remarkable life. As Milner reflected on how
to close his own article on Footnote Four, he turned to the words of
Hugo Black. Those words, written just two years after Footnote
Four was laid down, declared that: "Under our constitutional
system, courts stand against any winds that blow as havens of
refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because they are
helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming
victims of prejudice and public excitement."' 3 As I recount these
words, I am moved by how powerfully they embody the distilled
philosophy, the determined hope, and the lived commitments of
Milner Ball.
172 See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (upholding conviction of
Russian immigrants, referred to in dissent by Holmes as "puny anonymities," for advocating
labor strikes at ammunition factories); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216-17 (1919)
(upholding indictment under Espionage Act for approving Socialist Anti-War Proclamation).
... Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940) (Black, J., for a unanimous Court).
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APPENDIX A
The Wrath of Milner
by Sally Wyche Coenen
delivered on the occasion of Milner's seventieth birthday
I met Milner nineteen years ago. I liked him immediately, of
course. There's a lot to like about Milner-his great intellect and
thoughtfulness, his kind ways and calm manner. But during my
early encounters with Milner, I did not pick up on one essential
ingredient of Milner's make-up that is extremely important but
sometimes overlooked. It is about that trait that I want to speak
tonight.
During my early years in Athens, I served on the Community
Connection board with Milner. For all you non-Athenians here,
Community Connection is an information and referral organization
that links people in need with the social services available in the
area. Back in those days, Community Connection was a shoestring
operation and depended largely on funding from the United Way.
This arrangement made sense because Community Connection
provided one of the basic services that typically United Way
agencies would provide on their own-that is, basic information and
referral services.
One day Community Connection received the news, completely
out of the blue, that United Way would no longer provide any
funding for Community Connection. This news had dire
consequences for the continued existence of the agency, and Milner
was irate. He knew that if Community Connection should fold,
people in poverty would suffer all the more, a situation he found
outrageous and unacceptable.
So he set up a called meeting with the United Way board.
Community Connection's director, Tim Johnson, and I came along,
and it was a scene I will always remember. Milner entered the room
with a scowl on his face, knitted eyebrows, and glaring eyes. After
Tim and I made brief and polite presentations, Milner leaned
forward, glowering at the board members across the table. The
room suddenly became deathly quiet. With an intensity I had never
witnessed before in Milner, or anyone, he proceeded to assail,
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attack, berate, castigate, censure, criticize, denounce, excoriate, flay,
flog, lambaste, pummel, rebuke, reprimand, scathe, scold, shellac,
slam, slash, smear, thrash, upbraid, wallop, and whip those poor,
now trembling, cowering board members. That day I witnessed, in
full, the WRATH OF MILNER.
The next day we learned that Community Connection's funding
from United Way was not only completely restored but increased for
the upcoming year.
In the United Way board room that day I discovered that within
this typically calm and measured man lies a genuine ferocity.
Milner despises injustice. With passion he marshals his drive, his
intellect, and his many talents as a minister, as a lawyer, as a
professor, as a scholar, and as a man, to fight injustice wherever he
sees it.
So my toast tonight is to the WRATH OF MILNER-may it
continue to blaze in all its fury for many years to come.

